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persp ctivee
Chinese agricultural cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa is surrounded by 
preconceptions: high amounts of aid, massive land grabs to feed China, an 
inert cooperation model, and centralised orchestration by the government. 
These ideas mean that certain long-standing operators in the field of 
cooperation with Africa mistrust or even disregard this key player.
This mistrust must be overcome in the current context. Since the mid-1980s, 
funding for Africa’s agricultural development has been steadily declining, 
despite a slight upturn since the 2008 food crisis. Moreover, the cooperation 
models of traditional donors are being reformed, and agriculture is becoming 
an international priority once more. Although information is still lacking or 
opaque, it is important to clarify the rationale and the instruments of Chinese 
cooperation, and to compare viewpoints.
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In August 2013, the Chinese government published its second White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Coopera-
tion. Following on from the regular Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), this pub-
lication confirms China’s growing interest in 
sub-Saharan Africa since the early 2000s, seen 
in the presence of increasing numbers of Chi-
nese operators from both the public and private 
sectors, whether in trade (China-Africa trade 
has increased by a factor of 12 since 2000), direct 
investment (stocks from 10 to 45 billion dollars, 
according to sources), or development assistance.
This growing presence is generating rumours 
and preconceptions, which are often dissemi-
nated through the media. As a result of insuf-
ficient transparency in Chinese policy and a lack 
of understanding, these rumours and preconcep-
tions are leading some operators in the field of 
cooperation to mistrust or even disregard Chi-
nese agricultural cooperation. This mistrust pri-
marily concerns long-standing operators 
involved in cooperation with Africa, especially 
members of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development), and 
African leaders. It hampers cooperation between 
donors, which has nevertheless become neces-
sary in a context in which budget constraints are 
increasing and a consensus is emerging between 
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traditional donors on the importance of agricul-
ture for the development of sub-Saharan Africa.
Research conducted in sub-Saharan Africa gives 
a more specific overall picture of Chinese coop-
eration. It shows that certain preconceptions 
need to be tempered, such as those concerning 
the amount of aid, land acquisitions, the coop-
eration model, or the Chinese government’s 
orchestration of the presence of public and 
private operators in the sub-continent.
This research (see box p. 4) is based on three 
sources of analysis resulting from field surveys, 
which supplement the Chinese information 
available in the form of strategic documents or 
reports. The first originates in the study of 
around 100 Chinese projects, both public and 
private, in the agricultural sector (excluding 
forests) in sub-Saharan Africa (AFD-CIRAD, 
2013), a study that specifies the details of Chi-
nese aid. The second source derives from the 
exploitation of the Land Matrix database (2013), 
which records large-scale land acquisitions 
according to their status (intended, signed, 
under negotiation or annulled). The third source 
stems from research conducted in East Africa 
and Southern Africa by Tsinghua University.
China asserting  
its singularity
Although its cooperation policy is an element 
of its international geopolitics, and is therefore 
not disinterested, as in other countries, China is 
nevertheless asserting its singularity. As an 
emerging country imposing itself in interna-
tional affairs, it does not subscribe to certain 
norms adopted by the DAC countries. It distin-
guishes itself from North-South cooperation, 
which it sees as tainted by the colonial legacy, 
and has made non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states a key pillar of its foreign policy. 
It favours South-South cooperation on a basis 
it describes as win-win. It continues to maintain 
relations with states shunned by the interna-
tional community, and refuses relations with any 
nation that recognises Taiwan (Burkina Faso, 
Swaziland, São Tomé and Príncipe). Its aid is 
tied; it does not subscribe to the target of com-
mitting 0.7% of its gross national income to 
official development assistance; and its aid 
accounting rules differ from those adopted by 
the DAC countries.
Amounts are still low
China is considered as a major donor for agri-
culture in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although its funding has been increasing stead-
ily, especially since 2008, the amount of its aid 
remains limited, and is well below that of the 
OECD countries: around 130 million dollars 
from 2009 to 2012 (amount estimated from the 
cost of the agricultural demonstration centres, 
excluding multilateral aid, especially through the 
World Food Programme), compared to 3 billion 
dollars committed by DAC bilateral and multi-
lateral donors to agriculture and rural develop-
ment for 2012 alone. It should be noted that 
this comparison remains problematic and gives 
only an order of magnitude, as the figures are 
not based on the same definitions or statistical 
methodologies, and Chinese data is often 
opaque. This relatively modest contribution is 
confirmed by the AFD-CIRAD study: of the 
100 projects studied, 60% are awarded as grants 
(and the rest as public or private loans). More-
over, these projects only concern a small number 
of countries: Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal 
in West Africa, for 60%; and Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania and Mozambique in Southern Africa, 
for 40%.
Chinese agricultural aid is nevertheless expected 
to increase, alongside China’s massive interven-
tion in the construction of infrastructure and 
in the search for mineral and oil resources for 
its own growth.
Few land acquisitions,  
production for local markets
China is often accused of acquiring millions of 
hectares of land in sub-Saharan Africa to ensure 
its own food security.
According to Land Matrix data, China’s public 
and private land acquisitions represent only 
290 000 hectares, 15 times less than the land 
acquired by the United States, almost 10 times 
less than the United Arab Emirates and more 
than 6 times less than the United Kingdom. 
Chinese land acquisitions are concentrated in 
just a few countries: the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Benin. It 
should be noted that Africa is not a priority 
continent for China, which has acquired almost 
twice as much land in South America and in 
Southeast Asia.
With regard to the accusation of producing to 
“feed its own population”, evidence indicates 
that Chinese agricultural companies present 
in Africa produce food crops (vegetables, rice, 
beans, sugarcane, maize, soy, etc.) for domestic 
or regional markets. Far from feeding China, 
the African continent imports from this country 
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exports.
Some products are nevertheless exported, such 
as palm oil for the Chinese agro-food industry, 
or cotton and sisal for the textile industry.
A cooperation model  
that is evolving...
Contrary to the idea that China’s agricultural 
cooperation model is static, this model is in fact 
the result of developments due to political 
change in China and to the growing participa-
tion of Chinese operators in international 
debates on cooperation.
Prior to the 1980s, China assisted in building 
large state farms such as Mbarali and Ruvu in 
Tanzania, Kombe in Congo-Brazzaville, and 
Koba Farm in Guinea-Conakry. Despite good 
results at first, production rapidly declined, as 
economic viability was neglected in favour of 
political objectives. Without withdrawing fund-
ing for major projects, especially for irrigation 
in Ghana, Rwanda and Niger, China then 
focused on technology transfer and knowledge 
sharing with farmers: short training courses in 
vegetable growing or veterinary care; the provi-
sion of selected seeds; or the repair of agricul-
tural machinery. These transfers did not produce 
the anticipated results, as the local, economic, 
political and social contexts were not given suf-
ficient consideration during the project design 
stage.
   towards public-private  
partnerships
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government 
thoroughly reformed its cooperation policy. 
Based on its own experience of development, it 
has since advocated the market economy to 
enable rural Africa to escape poverty, by increas-
ing farmers’ incomes and improving their living 
conditions. It finances the construction of farms 
and equipment for local processing of agricul-
tural products, and sends Chinese technicians 
responsible for transferring and disseminating 
techniques developed in China.
Increasingly, China is associating its interven-
tions with private investment and commercial 
activities. For example, in Guinea, Mali and 
Ghana, Chinese companies have joined forces 
with local companies or investors, in the form 
of joint ventures. In Tanzania and Zambia, 
Chinese companies have established farms using 
subsidised loans granted by Eximbank, the 
export-import bank of China.
This model combining aid, investment and trade 
has intensified with the agricultural technology 
demonstration centres, announced at the 2006 
FOCAC in Beijing and confirmed since. Four 
centres were set up in 2010 (Cameroon, Liberia, 
Benin, Uganda), seven in 2011 (Mozambique, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, 
Rwanda, Congo-Brazzaville) and nine in 2012 
(Ethiopia, Togo, Angola, Mali, Congo-Kinshasa, 
Mauritania, Malawi, Central African Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire), with surface areas varying 
between 0.3 and 120 hectares.
These demonstration centres are evidence of the 
cooperation policy in force, based on public-
private partnerships, combining grants and 
commercial activities. For the first three years, 
the Chinese government awards grants: for the 
construction of the centre, carried out by Chi-
nese state-owned companies; and for agricul-
tural training and extension provided by Chi-
nese experts. After the first three years, the 
centres are expected to sell their training services 
and their products, especially vegetables, on local 
markets in order to become self-financing. 
As the creation of these centres is recent, there 
has not yet been any impact assessment.
The demonstration centres also illustrate a model 
based on technical-economic aspects, implying 
that food security is a matter of the availability 
of agricultural products. Consequently, China 
takes little account of constraints on demand, 
grain market failures, the institutional envi-
ronment or the role of agriculture against a 
broader development backdrop. Whether in the 
administrations responsible for cooperation or 
in research, it gives little attention to or even 
disregards issues of market instability, insur-
ance, youth employment in a context of rapid 
population growth in rural areas, or the struc-
tural transformation of agricultural economies. 
True to its principle of non-interference, and 
also aware of the insufficient number of its 
technical assistants, it has little involvement in 
the drafting of national agricultural policies or 
in the research agendas of national agricultural 
institutes.
A diversification  
of operators
Contrary to the idea that the government in 
Beijing is orchestrating a surge of Chinese com-
panies and entrepreneurs, Chinese cooperation 
is marked by the multiplication – most often 
uncoordinated – of diverse operators. Until the 
is slow. It is influenced by China’s own expe-
rience of development, by the assessment prac-
tices of other donors, by negotiations with the 
beneficiaries of aid (policy makers, farmers’ 
organisations), or by participation in interna-
tional negotiating bodies on aid effectiveness 
(the China-DAC Study Group, the Busan 
forum, etc.).
It is also influenced by experience sharing, as 
with the visit of Chinese operators to Embrapa 
(Brazil) to discuss Brazilian agricultural devel-
opment and what Africa can learn from it.
Finally, it is influenced by the circulation of ideas 
between national administrations in charge of 
cooperation, between trilateral cooperation 
partners, between the world of research and that 
of higher education, and between civil society 
representatives, etc.
Ideas and experiences are revealing a certain 
permeability, indicating that these worlds are 
not entirely distinct. This permeability should 
be encouraged in order to eradicate preconcep-
tions on both sides, based on the findings of 
research. It will then be possible to discuss the 
cooperation and development paradigms not 
only of China, but also of the traditional DAC 
donors. <
1990s, the Chinese government controlled all 
interventions in the agricultural sector in Africa. 
But since then, the institutional landscape has 
become more diversified and complex.
In China, development assistance is managed 
by three ministries: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Two state-owned banks finance 
Chinese companies in the agricultural sector in 
Africa: Eximbank grants loans either at prefer-
ential rates or at market conditions; the China 
Development Bank offers loans only at market 
conditions, and feeds the China-Africa Devel-
opment Fund, which invests in Africa, especially 
in agricultural projects. Furthermore, to avoid 
fierce competition in China, many public, 
national and provincial companies are investing 
in Africa. Some small private entrepreneurs are 
also venturing into poultry farming and vegeta-
ble growing; outside of any official cooperation, 
they are often unknown to the Chinese embas-
sies in the countries concerned.
Encouraging permeability
Since the 1950s, the Chinese agricultural coop-
eration model has been evolving, even if change 
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